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Youth as a Seismograph for Societal 
Problems
Sabine Kurtenbach
Over the course of the last two years, 2011 and 2012, youths around the world have pro-
tested in a variety of contexts and forms. More than the various manifestations of their 
protests – from political upheaval in Tunisia or Chile to violence in Syria – it is youths’ 
worries about their own place in society that unify them.
Analysis
Even in the most divergent societies, youth are perceived as a problem group, despite 
the fact that a consistent definition of what constitutes youth has been absent to date. 
To base such a definition exclusively on age would be misleading: other factors, for ex-
ample, social position, would remain unconsidered. No longer children but not yet part 
of the circle of adults, youths find themselves both physically and socially in a phase of 
transition. For very different reasons, they rebel against established orders and authori-
ties and question existing boundaries and conventions. However, even under very diffi-
cult political and economic conditions, youths only head onto the streets en masse when 
they see no prospects for the transition into adult life. The forms their protests take re-
veal fundamental societal processes and problems.
  Young people grow up with expectations about the transition into adult life that, be-
cause of rapid social change, can now scarcely be realized.
  The lifeworlds of youths and their problems with the entry into adult life are, de-
spite all the differences, comparable worldwide.
  The mobilization of youths and the nature of their protests are closely connected 
with the socialization processes and types of cohesion within a society.
  Whether and how youth are able to complete central transitions into adult life can 
serve as an early warning indicator of key societal problems.
Keywords: youth, political and social development, conflict, violence
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The Years 2011 and 2012 – A Time of Worldwide 
Youth Protests
In the last two years, 2011 and 2012, predomi-
nantly young people have protested worldwide 
against authoritarian regimes; social grievances; 
and, most recently, the power of banks and rat-
ing agencies. Some media outlets have compared 
these youth protests with those of 1968, when 
youths in many cities around the world also took 
to the streets. Now as then, the question of which 
attributes are common to the protest movements 
in the various regions has arisen. For one thing, 
the proportion of young men and women among 
the protestors is relatively high; for another, the 
protests are about central questions regarding the 
future of society. This applies, regardless of the 
concrete reason, to the protests of the Arab Spring 
as much as to the Occupy movement in the finan-
cial centers.
Transitions into Adulthood
The term “youth” generally denotes a life stage 
that involves the transition from life in the private 
environment of primary networks (family, clan, 
community) into the public sphere of society. 
While the transition from child to youth is closely 
connected with puberty and the reaching of sex-
ual maturity, the transition from youth to adult-
hood is tied to the completion of central rites of 
passage. Through the associated processes, and 
sometimes in connection with rituals, youth be-
come an active part of the society; responsibility 
for their own lives, as well as for the respective 
community, is handed over to them. The concrete 
possibilities and conditions for the completion of 
these transitions are historically and culturally de-
fined and thus very different. However, there are 
three central rites of passage into adult life that 
apply worldwide:
1) Marriage and the starting of a family: In most 
societies, particularly in the countries of the 
Global South, this was and is the most impor-
tant milestone for achieving adulthood.
2) Entry into the labor market: The resulting eco-
nomic independence from parents or other fam-
ily networks is in many cases simultaneously a 
central condition for starting a family.
3) Acquisition and exercise of civil rights: This is 
dependent to a large degree on the particular 
political system and the specific possibilities for 
participation and entails, for example, active 
and passive voting rights once one has reached 
a particular age or participation in other soci-
etal decisions in various contexts (local, nation-
al, state, civil society, etc.).
Despite historical changes and the different 
weight assigned to them, these rites of passage re-
main important markers along the path into adult 
life worldwide. Due to extended formal school-
ing and vocational training, the life phase “youth” 
has become longer in almost all regions. In those 
places where youths’ transition into adult life is 
blocked as a result of economic, social or politi-
cal developments, the length of the “youth” phase 
has been extended against the will of these youths. 
It is for this reason that in some societies in Afri-
ca, the Middle East and even Europe 30-year-olds 
are still considered youths; without their own in-
come, they are economically dependent on their 
parents or families and thus unable to start a fam-
ily. In the Middle East, one can speak of a “gen-
eration in waiting” (Dhillon and Yousef 2010). 
This situation is most certainly an important rea-
son for the strong mobilization of youth as part 
of the Arab Spring. However, in other contexts as 
well, the process of becoming an adult resembles 
an obstacle course with an uncertain outcome – 
for instance, where access to appropriate train-
ing and education, which is key to economic in-
dependence, is absent. The protests of university 
students in Chile in 2011 and Mexico in 2012 ex-
emplify this.
A particular problem is the divergence, under 
current conditions, of individual and collective 
notions regarding the rites of passage into adult 
life and the concrete possibilities to actually real-
ize them. Families, schools and community pro-
duce expectations within the framework of social-
ization processes, both on the part of youths and 
on the part of adults, as to the necessary rites of 
passage and conditions for complete membership 
in the particular society. In many cases, howev-
er, these transitions do not occur due to rapid so-
cial change, economic crises and societal upheav-
als. The majority of the protests over the past two 
years have been driven by the fact that young peo-
ple either view their opportunities to complete 
central transitions as restricted or want to expand 
them.
In almost all regions of the world, exception-
al events or developments occurred before the ac-
celeration of the protests and provided the moti-
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vation behind them. In Tunisia this was the self-
immolation of a young vegetable vendor who 
had been harassed by the police; in Chile it was 
the government’s refusal to change the statute of 
the central university; and in London it was the 
death of a 29-year-old man during a police opera-
tion. The initial protests and acts of violence find 
many supporters and copycats, who in some cir-
cumstances have the same, but at times complete-
ly different, goals. The reaction of the particular 
government and its security forces plays a central 
role in the continuation and escalation. A look at 
the lifeworlds in the different regions of the world 
makes clear which problems are especially diffi-
cult for youths.
Lifeworlds
Despite all the differences, there are three process-
es that today influence the lifeworlds of youth: de-
mographic developments; urbanization and mi-
gration; and, last but not least, globalization.
Demographic changes are a central component of 
the processes of social change. At the beginning 
of November 2011, the United Nations welcomed 
the seven billionth world citizen. Both the region 
in which this child was born and the demograph-
ic realities of the immediate environment will de-
cisively impact its life prospects. Industrial societ-
ies such as Germany have a steadily aging popu-
lation. This theoretically improves younger peo-
ple’s chances in the labor market, but at the same 
time puts pressure on the social welfare system. In 
contrast, in the poorest developing countries more 
than half of the population is under 20 years old. It 
is these societies that will continue to grow in the 
coming decades. The dependency ratio, among 
other things, makes clear the accompanying prob-
lems. While this ratio lies at 41.5 for East Asia and 
the Pacific, it is more than twice as high in South 
Africa at 83.5. In contrast, from a demographic 
perspective societies with decreasing birth rates 
and increasing life expectancy have the chance of 
“demographic dividends” when they are able to 
increase growth and wealth as a result of a high 
proportion of the population being of working 
age. China’s rigorous one-child policy is an an-
swer to the challenges of demographic change.
Migration and urbanization also influence the 
lifeworlds and thus the transitions of youths 
worldwide. In agrarian societies youth continue 
to gradually grow into the adult world and take 
on successive social duties. However, in many 
cases they have no access to education beyond the 
primary school level. Migration and urbanization 
offer a way out. Yet the barriers to transborder mi-
gration are increasing worldwide, particularly at 
the interfaces between developing and industrial 
countries. For instance, the USA has been building 
an extensive separating wall at the Mexican bor-
der, and the EU intercepts refugees and migrants 
on the Mediterranean Sea. Yet event though illegal 
migration entails dangers, it nevertheless offers 
opportunities for social mobility and a way out of 
traditional roles and precarious living conditions 
– for example, a lack of social infrastructure or ed-
ucational opportunities. The 2009 Human Develop-
ment Report (UNDP 2009: 67) found that migrants, 
even in societies where they are forced to move 
due to armed conflict, can improve their human 
development level by up to 23 percent. It is thus 
little wonder that youths represent one-third of 
transborder migrants worldwide. The number of 
those who migrate within country borders is cer-
tainly significantly higher, but no internationally 
comparable data on this phenomenon exist.
The year 2010 was presumably the first in hu-
man history in which the majority of the popula-
tion lived in cities. The most rapidly growing cit-
ies in the world are located in countries of the 
Global South – led by Mumbai and Mexico City 
with approximately 20 million residents each and 
numerous metropolises with approximately 10 
million residents (for example, Cairo, Manila, La-
gos, Jakarta).
Yet for youth, migration and urbanization are 
connected not only with chances but also with 
dangers: Youths are in many cases left to care for 
themselves in the cities; are responsible, as the 
head of the family, for younger siblings; or must 
work in order to contribute to their family’s liveli-
hood. Charles Dickens described the accompany-
ing conflicts in nineteenth-century London strik-
ingly in his novel Oliver Twist. Surviving today in 
the slums of Calcutta or the favelas of Rio de Janei-
ro is different, but not easier. Here too it is the so-
cial infrastructure – which is especially important 
for children and youths, above all in the health 
and education systems – that is absent, and infor-
mal networks at least partially replace state insti-
tutions.
The increasing interconnectedness of the 
world in the context of globalization has ultimate-
ly led to fundamental changes in the demands on 
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and possibilities for youth. This applies on the one 
hand to their use of new digital media. Youths are 
way ahead of their parents’ generation in this re-
spect. Even when it is first and foremost youth 
from the middle and upper classes who have ac-
cess to these technologies, the number of Inter-
net users is growing worldwide, particularly in 
developing countries. Youth are overrepresented 
within virtual social networks. Here new forms 
of communication are coming into existence that 
are contributing not only to the spread of music 
(rap, hip-hop) and consumption patterns but al-
so to the diffusion of values and norms. New so-
cial media such as Facebook or Twitter are not on-
ly accelerating global communication, but are al-
so being used by young people for the organiza-
tion and mobilization of protests, as the Arab So-
cial Media Report (2011) has demonstrated for the 
case of the Arab Spring. The Mexican Yo Soy 132 
movement, which led to more transparency and 
debates in the 2012 presidential campaign, is an-
other example. At the same time, however, glo-
balization has changed the requirements for en-
tering the labor market. Here it is not just educa-
tion alone, but rather education fitting to the glo-
balized economy that is key to the transition into 
economic independence. The over-proportional-
ly high level of youth unemployment worldwide 
makes clear the problems related to this.
While an ever-increasing number of children 
have access to primary education, this is only one 
of several conditions for the later entry into work-
ing life. In many societies it is not those youths 
without any education who are unemployed; 
rather, it is often those who have completed sec-
ondary school or university. In Egypt, for exam-
ple, the unemployment level among young uni-
versity graduates is ten times higher than it is 
among young people who have only completed 
primary school (Goldstone 2011: 4). In addition to 
the absence of jobs, there is in many cases a strong 
discrepancy between education and personal ex-
pectations on the one hand and the requirements 
of the labor market on the other hand. For uni-
versity graduates in Latin America and the Mid-
dle East, for instance, the civil service continues to 
be the employer of choice. However, given emp-
ty coffers and, often, the provision of access to po-
sitions through personal patronage relationships, 
these jobs remain out of reach for many graduates.
In view of these precarious lifeworlds, young 
people – above all unemployed young men – are 
often perceived as a risk to societal stability or 
even to international security. Particularly in re-
lation to the Arab world, the so-called “youth 
bulge” hypothesis grew in popularity well in ad-
vance of the Arab Spring. People speak of a youth 
bulge when the proportion of 15- to 24-year-olds 
Proportion of Youth (15- to 25-years-old) in 
the Population, 2009
Proportion of Youth in Cities, 2005
In percent Examples In percent Examples
World 17.6 50
Africa (incl. North Africa) 20.2 Mauritius 18.0
Egypt 20.2
Zimbabwe 25.2
41 Burundi 11
Sudan 41
Gabon 84
Asia (incl. the Middle East) 18.1 Japan 9.9
China 16.9
India 19.3
Maldives 24.5
43 Sri Lanka 16 
India 32
China 46
Singapore 100
Europe (incl. Russia) 12.7 Italy 9.8
Germany 11.2
Russia 14.4
Albania 19.1
73 Albania 39
Russia 74
Belgium 97
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (incl. Mexico)
17.9 Netherlands Antilles 11.5
Brazil 17.3
Grenada 22.6
78 Trinidad & Tobago 12
Mexico 77
Martinique 98
North America 14.1 83
Oceania 15.3 Australia13.6
Micronesia 22.6
67 Papua New Guinea 15
Australia 89
Table 1: Demography and Urbanization
Source: WYR 2010, Annex, Tables 1 and 2, 95–107.
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  1/2013
in the overall population is over-proportionally 
large (above 20 percent). The proportion of youth 
at the global level is currently 17.6 percent (WYR 
2010: 95). What is seen here as holding the poten-
tial for conflict is above all a high percentage of 
young men without prospects for integration ei-
ther in the labor market or the political system 
(Urdal 2006, 2011). This debate focuses primarily 
on the structural conditions that motivate young 
people to participate in political violence. Youth’s 
radicalization and their transgression of societal 
boundaries is usually assigned to a greater readi-
ness for risk and a lower degree of integration in 
the status quo. However, even in the most diffi-
cult of conditions there is no automatism in this 
respect, otherwise far more young people would 
act violently. Thus, the question arises as to how 
and for what youths in these contexts can be mo-
bilized. A great degree of variation, which is close-
ly connected to the forms of socialization and the 
central societal problems, is evident here.
One question which has been inadequately 
empirically investigated to date is that regarding 
the connection between the forms of protest and 
the political regime. While the youths of the Ar-
ab Spring called the existing regimes into question 
in a highly politicized manner, the complaints in 
Latin America regarding societal problems such 
as inequality and the absence of prospects for the 
future have manifested overwhelmingly – though 
not exclusively, as the examples of Chile and 
Mexico show – as sporadic violent protests, pet-
ty crime, and political apathy. Against this back-
ground, youth have been perceived for the most 
part as hooligans, not as political actors. The Chil-
ean student movement has been an exception in 
this respect. In Mexico the attempts to criminal-
ize the Yo Soy 132 movement failed due to youths’ 
massive mobilization in support of the initiators 
of the protests against the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party’s (PRI) presidential candidate.
Mobilization and Social Cohesion
Mobilization for joint action is closely connect-
ed with existing forms of social cohesion, which, 
however, not only change but also multiply in the 
context of social change. Thus, loyalties in differ-
entiated societies are not based exclusively on lo-
cally confined belonging to family networks, reli-
gious communities or a particular village, but al-
so on broader concepts such as citizens’ rights or 
the “nation.” The related structures demonstrate a 
broad spectrum of types of organization: They can 
Table 2: Youth and (Un)Employment
Proportion of Youth Working (in percent), 
2008
Unemployment (in percent)
Aged 15–19 Aged 20–24 Youths Adults
Africa (incl. North 
Africa)
South Africa 9
Uganda 75
Sudan 44
Burundi 92
South Africa 
Ethiopia
Zimbabwe
Algeria
Nigeria
47
25
25
24
15
18
13
4
9
2
Asia (incl. the Middle 
East)
Kuwait 6
India 33
China 40
Cambodia 63
Iraq 38
India 57
China 79
Laos 84
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
India
25
21
11
5
3
4
Europe (incl. Russia) Hungary 4
Germany 32
Iceland 75
Moldavia 33
Russia 59
Netherlands 82
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Spain 
Russia
59
44
25
15
25
16
10
5
Latin America and 
the Caribbean (incl. 
Mexico)
Martinique 4
Brazil 49
Haiti 61
Surinam 45
Brazil 78
Barbados 81
Uruguay
Columbia
Mexico
24
21
7
6
8
3
North America USA 40
Canada 56
USA 74
Canada 78
USA 11 4
Oceania Fr. Polynesia 18
Australia 59
Vanuatu 68
Solomon Islands 41
Australia 82
Vanuatu 85
Solomon Islands 
Australia
46
9
26
3
Source: WYR 2010, Annex, Tables 7 and 8, 138–153.
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be authoritarian and hierarchical, or democratic 
and open. Generally different forms coexist, and 
don’t necessarily have to rule one another out. In 
societies with a high degree of conflict potential, 
however, there exist multiple forms of social co-
hesion, which exclude one another – for example, 
religious, ethnic or social identities. Therefore, 
when looking at youth, the question of whether 
and how young people are integrated into the ex-
isting patterns of social cohesion is a decisive one.
Differences exist above all in the way in which 
youths and adults are part of the society’s social-
ization processes. In many cases youths are ac-
companied, instructed or controlled by adults – 
for example, in the youth organizations of polit-
ical parties, unions or religious associations. So-
cialization processes that take place under the 
control of adults have a conservative bias and aim 
particularly to maintain the existing social order 
– or to change it according to the adults’ wishes. 
The room for change is limited and/or dependent 
on the flexibility and openness of the societal in-
stitutions.
This is especially clear in different contexts of 
violence: In industrialized societies the national 
armed forces, as the “School of the Nation,” have 
long played a central role in the socialization and 
integration of young men. In many countries of 
the South they still play a role today. The reintro-
duction of compulsory military service in Cambo-
dia in 2006 was directly connected to controlling 
the growing number of unemployed young men. 
In contrast, the majority of Latin American coun-
tries have abolished compulsory military service 
in the course of democratization. In the Middle 
East, North Africa and several South East Asian 
countries, though, it remains widespread. In most 
nonstate armed groups youth also play a role pri-
marily as fighters, while adults take on the leader-
ship positions.
The mobilization of youth in Algeria in the 
1990s is an interesting example in this regard. In 
this case the Islamists managed to politicize un-
employed youths with no prospects and to mo-
bilize them for armed battle against the regime. 
The rush of victory was followed by military de-
feat and then, quickly, political disillusionment 
and apathy (Martínez 2004). This background 
may have contributed significantly to the fact that 
the protests of the Arab Spring only spilled over in 
a limited way to Algeria – in connection with the 
May 2012 elections.
However, there are also forms of socialization 
that have been more or less autonomously orga-
nized by youths. Although these now also include 
hierarchical structures, at least the age differenc-
es are significantly smaller – something that none-
theless isn’t automatically accompanied by egal-
itarian power structures. The absence of surveil-
lance and control by adults often results in these 
peer-group activities being viewed with skepti-
cism. Particularly when youths transgress the pre-
vailing rules and conventions, they are viewed as 
being “unruly” or “out of control.” Central Ameri-
ca and West Africa offer ample evidence in this re-
gard. Here the focus is on youths’ real or alleged 
misconduct. In Central America youth have in re-
cent years been stylized as enemies of the state 
(Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2010); the security forces 
persecute them in a repressive manner similar to 
that used against guerilla groups. Youth gangs are 
ascribed responsibility for the escalating violence, 
while their exclusion from society is given as little 
attention as the involvement of the military, the 
police and politics in the violence. In West Africa, 
young fighters are characterized as brainless, vio-
lent “war machines,” while the multifaceted prob-
lems that youth face are ignored (Hoffman 2011). 
In both cases youths serve as scapegoats intend-
ed to distract from societal ills such as unemploy-
ment, inequality and corruption.
Beyond organizational structure, the possibili-
ties for and forms of young people’s socialization 
within society vary according to the type of polit-
ical regime. Democratic systems – at least in the-
ory – offer youth equal participation once they’ve 
reached voting age, while in authoritarian regimes 
this participation is based on membership in po-
litical, social, ethnic or religious groups or patron-
age networks. Long-term studies on youths’ po-
litical participation have shown that their early 
engagement has long-term effects on the norms 
and values they stand for and is a good indica-
tor of their political attitudes as adults (Youniss 
and Hart 2005). If they are to become responsible 
citizens, youths therefore require not only a vote 
(in elections or other decision-making processes) 
but also an active role in shaping their lifeworlds. 
Because in most countries public policy is over-
whelmingly made by adults for adults, youths can 
mostly only make themselves heard through loud 
and public protest. Against this background, the 
many protests of 2011 and 2012 point to the cen-
tral problems of the youths in the respective coun-
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tries and in particular to their blocked transitions 
into adult life.
Youth as a Seismograph
The youth protests of the last two years reflect 
two closely connected, overarching conflicts: 
First, youths’ blocked path into economic inde-
pendence, and second, their lack of participation 
in deciding political questions that are critical to 
their ability to realize future opportunities.
In many regions the education system and the 
labor market do not make it possible for young 
people to obtain a future-oriented education or to 
find work. In Chile the protests have been direct-
ed against an education system that is to a great 
extent commercialized and privatized, and thus 
hinders social mobility. In Mexico the students of 
private universities see their opportunities as be-
ing endangered by the return of the PRI and its 
clientelist politics. In Spain and many countries 
of the Middle East, unemployment, even among 
well-educated young people, is particularly high. 
Yet even in those places where youth have work, 
the percentage of those who can’t survive on this 
income is considerable. In this respect the polit-
ical systems are clearly failing, independently of 
whether they are democratic or authoritarian.
The problems facing the youths who took to 
the streets in 2011 and 2012 had long been known; 
however, no measures to overcome them had 
been undertaken. Whether such protests become 
violent – as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Greece 
and Great Britain – also depends upon wheth-
er youths are taken seriously, not only in “pret-
ty speeches” but also as central actors of the fu-
ture. Where this is not the case, the sporadic pro-
tests could very likely transform into calls for 
the overthrow of the particular political regime. 
This applies equally to the societies of the Arab 
Spring and those in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia. Youths everywhere are mobilized (and con-
trolled) for political purposes, but only rarely do 
they receive the leeway to organize autonomously 
or to formulate (let alone implement) alternative 
lifeworlds. The 1.2 billion youths in the countries 
of the Global South are already too large a group 
to be ignored. Rather, their problems should serve 
as a seismograph and an early warning system for 
fundamental societal problems. Where societies 
react flexibly and openly to the need for reform, 
youth have a chance to participate actively and to 
shape the future of their society.
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